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Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical Law, American Bar
Association. Author of CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED(1939), AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS (1944) and contributor of
articles on aviation law to legal periodicals.
W ITHIN a few days it will be one year since the adoption of the
VFederal Airport Act I providing $500,000,000 in Federal funds
over a seven-year period to carry out a National airport plan. Under
that Act states and cities must match, chiefly on a 50-50 basis, the Fed-
eral expenditure. We will, therefore, have more than $1,000,000,000
expended on publicly-owned airports within the next seven years.
In addition to publicly-owned airports, we have hundreds of new
privately-owned airports being established throughout the Nation.
The impetus given to all aviation by the great technical achievements
growing out of the War has made most of these privately-owned air-
ports a financial success, thus inducing more people to create such
businesses. Perhaps one of the most noteworthy developments in re-
cent years is the movement to establish downtown airparks where small
planes can land and take off.
We now have, therefore, a tremendous growth in the number and
size of airports and we can look for a vast expansion in this field in the
near future. All of this intense activity in the airport field creates many.
legal problems to which we as lawyers must give attention.
About 20 years ago cities began their first efforts to acquire land for
the development of airports in an effort to secure the airmail service
which was then developing into a major need. Air transportation was
then in its infancy. As indicative of the doubts of the future of civil
aviation which some people then expressed I call your attention to the
argument advanced by a taxpayer in St. Louis, Missouri, in attacking
the expenditure of $2,000,000 by that City for an airport. He said of
the airport: 2
"It will afford a starting and landing place for a few wealthy,
ultra-reckless persons, who own planes and who are engaged in pri-
vate pleasure flying. They may pay somewhat for the privilege. It
will afford a starting and landing place for pleasure tourists from
other cities, alighting in St. Louis while flitting here and yon. It
will offer a passenger station for the very few persons who are able
1 60 Stat. 170, 49 USCA § 1101 (Supp. 1946), approved May 13, 1946.
2 Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W. (2d) 1045, 1929 USAvR
15 (1928).
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to afford, and who desire to experience, the thrill of a novel and ex-
pensive mode of luxurious transportation.
"The number of persons using the airport will be about equal to
the total number of persons who engage in big-game hunting, trips
to the African wilderness, and voyages of North Pole Exploration.
"In the very nature of things, the vast majority of the inhabi-
tants of the city, a 99 per cent majority, cannot now, and never can,
reap any benefit from the existence of an airport.
"True it may be permitted to the ordinary common garden
variety of citizen to enter the airport free of charge, so that he may
press his face against some restricting barrier, and sunburn his
throat gazing at his more fortunate compatriots as they sportingly
navigate the empyrean blue.
"But beyond that, beyond the right to hungrily look on, the or-
dinary citizen gets no benefit from the taxes he is forced to pay."
In this case, the Missouri Supreme Court with unusual foresight for the
time of the decision (December 6, 1928), brushed aside the plaintiff's
contentions and stated in part:
"It is unquestionably true that the airplane is not in general
use as a means of travel or transportation either in the City of St.
Louis or elsewhere; and it never will be unless properly equipped
landing fields are established."
The Court's conclusion was as follows:
"An airport with its beacons, landing fields, runways, and
hangars is analogous to a harbor with its lights, wharves, and
docks; the one is the landing place and haven of ships that navigate
the water, the other of those that navigate the air. With respect to
the public use which each subserves they are essentially of the same
character. If the ownership and maintenance of one falls within the
scope of municipal government, it would seem that the other must
necessarily do so. We accordingly hold that the acquisition and con-
trol of an airport is a city purpose within the purview of general
constitutional law."
In the same year the great Justice Cardozo, then a member of the
New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the power of the City of
Utica to issue bonds payable from tax funds for the development of
an airport, said as follows: 3
"We think the purpose to be served is both public and munici-
pal. A city acts for city purposes when it builds a dock or a bridge
or a street or a subway. Its purpose is not different when it builds
an airport. Aviation is today an established method of transporta-
tion. The future, even the near future will make it still more
general. The city that is without the foresight to build the ports for
the new traffic may soon be left behind in the race of competition.
Chalcedon was called the city of the blind because its founders re-
jected the nobler site of Byzantium lying at their feet. The need for
vision of the future in the governance of cities has not lessened with
the years. The dweller within the gates, even more than the
stranger from afar, will pay the price of blindness."
Wisconsin and all the other states now have state legislation which
authorizes cities and counties to acquire and develop airports. 4 While
the courts of 27 states in 51 decisions have held that airports are a pub-
3 Hesse v. Rath, 249 N. Y. 435, 164 N.E. 342, 1929 USAvR 10 (1928).
4 See RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS (1944) 20.
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lic purpose, 5 this is no guarantee that some court will not depart from
this long line of authorities. In 1944, for example, the Supreme Court
of Illinois handed down a decision holding that airports are not a pub-
lic purpose within the provisions of the Illinois Constitution relating
to the expenditure of public tax funds. 6 The decision was unanimous,
and if allowed to stand it meant that some $20,000,000 worth of air-
port bonds were worthless. A petition for rehearing was filed and the
Court reversed its decision on this point, 7 so airports in Illinois are now
held to be a public purpose upon which cities may expend public tax
funds. I merely call this problem to your attention because it may
shortly arise in your state. 8 1 do not think it will be a serious problem
because the public purpose of airports seems to be well established in
the law.
AIRPORTS AND INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNERS
Perhaps the most difficult problem arising out of the tremendous
expansion in the airport field is that of the conflicting interests and
rights of airports and adjacent property owners. It'is claimed that air-
ports cause injury to adjacent property owners by low flights which
cause noise, dust, fear of injury from falling planes, and glare from the
landing and take-off lights of planes. It is also claimed that airports
attract uncontrollable crowds and traffic which are an annoyance of
considerable magnitude. Airplanes warming up before take-offs are al-
leged to create noise and dust. The lights of the airport also create a
glare disturbing to adjacent property owners. Allegations of injury to
health, business and property are made in most of the cases. . Deprecia-
tion in the value of property adjacent to the airport is also an element
of the damage claimed. In one case great gusts of air from airplane
propellers were alleged to be so strong as to upset furniture in a home
adjacent to the City of Atlanta airport. 10 In a similar case in Iowa, it
was alleged that the wind from the airplane propellers frequently blew
off an adjacent landowner's hat and that the suction pulled off his bed
covers. 11
On the other side, it is sometimes claimed that adjacent landowners
injure airports by creation or maintenance of hazards which take the
form of glare in the eyes of pilots, dust or smoke which lessen visibility,
and electrical interference which prevents contact between airport radio
5 Ibid., p. 17-29.
6 People ex rel. Greening v. Bartholf, 235 C.C.H. § 1877 (Ill. March 21, 1944).
7 People ex rel. Greening v. Bartholf, 288 Ill. 445, 58 N.E. (2d) 172, 1944
USAvR 40 (Nov. 22, 1944). See also the later case of People ex rel. Curren v.
Wood, 391 Ill, 237, 62 N.E. (2d) 809, 1946 USAvR 299 (1945).
8 Wisconsin is one of the states where the highest court has not yet directly
passed upon the validity of the expenditure of public funds for airport purposes.
This point may well arise as a result of participation in the National airport
plan under the Federal Airport Act, and may require a test case, if bond houses
have any doubts on the subject.
9 See RHYNE, supra, note 4 at pages 119-131.
10 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. (2d) 245 (1942).
11 See Time Magazine, Sept. 9, 1946, and Noel, Airports and Their Neighbors,
19 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (1946).
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control towers and aviators. 12 Physical obstructions such as buildings or
other structures or objects of natural growth such as trees in airport
approach zones can, if erected or maintained by adjacent landowners,
render use of an airport extremely hazardous or impossible. In Cali-
fornia', one landowner erected 20-foot poles on his property to make it
dangerous to use an adjacent airport. He did this out of malice and
spite to force the airport owner to purchase his property. 13 In Pennsyl-
vania in a similar case the property owner erected a tower 154 feet
high and 8 feet square. This tower fell so he erected a new one 90 feet
high, which burned down. 14 In Iowa an adjacent landowner planted
fast growing trees expected to reach the height of 35 feet and render
use of the airport extremely hazardous. When enjoined from allowing,
constructing or maintaining anything over 25 feet in height, he erected
a pole 24 feet 8 inches in height topped by a fluttering red flag. 15
In solving the legal problems growing out of the conflicting claims
of property owners and airport owners which have been enumerated
above, the courts have attempted to apply some of the oldest rules of
the common law to this, our newest form of transportation. In every
one of the 30-odd cases which have arisen in this field, the courts have
been forced to consider the so-called ad coelum doctrine. That doctrine
grows out of the ancient Latin phrase "Cuus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos," meaning "He who owns the soil owns every-
thing above and below, from heaven to hell." 16 This maxim originated
in England and was brought into the jurisprudence of the United States
by our adoption of the English Common Law. 17
The best known as well as one of the most recent conflicts between
a landowner and an airport owner or operator is that between the
United States and the owner of a small farm adjacent to the Greensboro,
12 Hunter, The Conflicting Interests of Airport Owner and Nearby Property
Owner, 11 Law and Contemp. Prob. 539 (1946).1 3United Airports of California v. Hinman, 1940 USAvR 1 (U.S.D.C.S.D.
Cal. 1939). The Court enjoined this property owner from erecting any structures
higher than 10 feet within 200 feet of the airport, 20 feet within 200-500 feet, 50
feet within 500-1000 feet, and 100 feet within 1000 feet to the end of the land-
owner's property line.
14 Commonwealth v. Von Bestecki, 43 Dauphin Co. Rep. 446, 1937 USAvR 1
(Ct. of Comm. Pleas, Dauphin Co., Pa., 1937). The Court enjoined erection of any
more such structures on the grounds that they were a nuisance.
15 City of Iowa City v. Tucker, 1936 USAvR 10 (Dist. Ct. Johnson Co., Iowa,
1935), and note (1937) 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 293, 294.
16 See RHYNE, supra,.note 4, at page 94 et seq.
.7 The maxim is supposed to have been adopted by Lord Coke from an ob-
scure glossator on Justinian's Digest of Roman Law. Blackstone restated and
carried the maxim forward in his famous Commentaries and some modern authori-
ties on real property have stated the maxim in much the same form. See, Sweeney,
Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American
Law, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 329, 531 (1932). Maxims are not "law" and are not
given effect as legal rules in cases to which it is unreasonable to apply them. As
stated by one of the leading cases in this field of aviation law: "Maxims are
but attempted general statements of law. The judicial process is the continuous
effort on the part of the courts to .state accurately the general rules with their
proper and necessary limitations and exceptions. 'A maxim,' said Sir Frederick
Pollack, 'is a symbol or vehicle of the law so far as it goes, it is not the law itself
still less the whole of the law even on its own ground'." Swetland v. Curtiss Air-
ports Corporation, 41 F. (2d) 929, 1930 USAvR 21 (D.C. Ohio, 1930), modified
55 F. (2d) 201, 1932 USAvR 1 (C.C.A. 6th, 1931).
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North Carolina, municipally-owned airport. This case, Causby v.
United States"" is factually typical of the cases in this field. There the
Government in 1942 secured a non-exclusive lease for the use of this
airport renewable until 1967 or until six months after the war emer-
gency, whichever occurred first. Approximately 4% of the time in tak-
ing off and 7% of the time in landing, the prevailing winds required
airplanes using the airport to fly directly over Causby's home, which
was located 2275 feet from the airport. The 30-to-i safe glide angle ap-
proved by the C.A.A. passes over the Causby property at 83 feet, and is
67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the
highest tree. Up until the United States began using the airport no diffi-
culty was experienced by the Causbys from the use of the airport by
civilian aircraft. Since the United States began its operation, its four-
motored heavy bombers and other planes had passed over the Causby
property so close to the top of the trees as to blow the old leaves off,
the noise from the planes was startling, and at night the glare from the
planes lighted up the whole farm. The noise made it necessary for the
Causbys to give. up their chicken business because as many as six to
ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from
fright. The total number of chickens lost was about 150. Production
also fell off, and the result was the complete destruction of the use of
the property as a commercial chicken farm. The Causbys also claimed
that they were deprived of their sleep because they were nervous and
frightened by the low flights of the planes. While no accidents had oc-
curred on the Causby property, there had been several accidents on
adjacent land.
The Causbys brought suit in the Court of Claims alleging that the
United States had taken an easement over their property and that under
the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution this was a taking for
public use without just compensation in violation of that Amendment.
The Court of Claims agreed with this contention and entered a judg-
ment of $2,000. On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the judgment because there Was no finding as to the exact
nature of the easement taken, but held that a servitude had been im-
posed on the Causby land which entitled them to recovery on the theory
stated. The Court said in part:
"It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the
land extended to the periphery of the universe-Cujus est solum
ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the mod-
ern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared.
Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the
operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the
idea. T6 recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog
these highways, seriously interfere with their control and develop-
ment in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership
that to which only the public has a just claim."
The Court then stated that "the landowner owns at least as much of
the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with
18 328 U.S. 256, 1946 USAvR 245 (1946) ; see comment by Negel, 14 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 112 (1947).
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the land." In making such a holding the court certainly evolved a new
concept of property in air space which gives landowners a new remedy
for injuries suffered in this field. The property concept is the chief
significance of the case. The court summarized its opinion as follows:
"The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and
the inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable
under the Fifth Amendment. The airspace, apart from the imme-
diate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. We need
not determine at this time what those precise limits are. Flights
over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the en-joyment and use of the land. We need not speculate on that phase of
the present case. For the findings of the Court of Claims plainly
establish that there was a diminution in value of the property and
that the frequent, low-level flights were the direct and immediate
cause. We agree with the Court of Claims that a servitude has been
imposed upon the land."
The Federal Government was not subject to suit in tort at the time
this case arose 19 so it was necessary to work out this property taking
concept to give the landowner a remedy. The other cases in this field
have concerned themselves with whether the injury to an adjacent land-
owner is or was a nuisance or a trespass and whether the injury is of such
a character as to warrant the granting of an injunction or monetary
damages or both. 20 The importance of the trespass and nuisance doc-
trines is that in case of a trespass an injunction and nominal damages
may be granted even though a flight through the air space over par-
ticular land did no damage, while in a nuisance case an injunction and
damages may be granted only where there is proof of actual damage.21
With the exception of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 22
and lower courts in Delaware, 23 Pennsylvania 24 and Nebraska, 25 all the
courts in passing upon cases in this field have rejected the trespass theory
and adopted the nuisance theory. With the above quoted statement by
the Supreme Court that "common sense revolts at the idea" of "count-
less trespass suits" it is to be hoped that he trespass theory will die a
well deserved death. The Courts which had considered whether low
flights over property adjacent to airports could create a prescriptive
right or easement prior to the Causby case had held that such flights
could not create such rights. 26
Five theories of air space rights had been advanced in the cases de-
cided prior to the Causby case. These theories are: 27
19 Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 Stat. 482, 28 USCA § 921 (Supp. 1946), ap-
proved August 2, 1946 allows suits in tort against the Federal Government.
20 See RHYNE, supra, note 4, pages 82-163.
21 Hunter, supra, note 12, at page 549.
22 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 1930
USAvR 1 (1930), and Burnham v. Beverly Airways Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.
USAvR 39 (Ct. Q. Sess. Jeff. Ct., Pa., 1922).
23 Vanderslice v. Shawn, 27 A. (2d) 87, 1942 USAvR 11 (Del. Ct. Chan.,
1942).
24 Commonwealth v. Nevin and Smith, 2 Pa. Dist. and C. Ct. Rep. 241, 1928
USAvR 39 (Ct. Q. Sess. Jeff. Ct., Pa, 1922).
25 Glatt v. Page, unreported officially (Third Judicial Dist., Docket 93-115,
8th Dist. Ct. Neb., 1928).2 6 RHYNE, supra, note 4, page 107 et seq.
27 RHYNE, ibid., pages 154-162.
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(1) the landowner owns all the air space above his property with-
out limit in extent;(2) the landowner owns the air space above his property to an un-
limited extent subject to an "easement" or "privilege" of flight
in the public;
(3) the landowner owns the air space up to such height as is fixed
by statute, with flights under that height "trespasses";
(4) the landowner owns the air space up as far as it is possible for
him to take effective possession but beyond the "possible ef-
fective possession zone" there is no ownership in air space; and(5) the landowner owns only the air space he actually occupies and
and can only object to such use of the air space over his
property as does actual damage.
No court has held that the first theory applies in the aviation field.
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics 28, which is in force in 22 states,
and the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts 29,
follow the second theory with only the Delaware Court decision 30 sup-
porting it. Since it is based on the discredited ad coelum maxim this
theory stands condemned by a vast majority of the court decisions in this
field. The third theory is followed by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts 31 and, by a lower court in Minnesota, 32 but such statutory
flight limitations are in fact safety regulations rather than property rules,
so such decisions are unsound in principle. The fourth theory, iie. own-
ership of a "possible effective possession zone" has received approval by
the courts of Georgia, 33 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals of the
United States, 34 and indirectly by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts. 35 The difficulty with this theory is that it would seem to
authorize recovery of nominal damages and the securing of an injunc-
tion where no actual damage is done, although the courts adopting it
to date have not decreed such a result. The fifth or "actual use" theory
has been adopted by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in the Hinman 36 case and by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Causby case. 37 The Supreme Court cited the Hin-
man case in holding that "the landowner owns at least as much air space
as he can occupy or use in connection with the land." The Supreme
Court uses the word "can" in the sense of present use, thus getting
away from the "possible effective possession zone" theory. 38
Since the Causby decision was handed down by the Supreme Court
on May 27, 1947, two decisions enjoining the construction of proposed
private airports have been reported. In both cases suits for injunctions
were brought by adjacent landowners against the owner and operator
28 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 17 (1923).
29 Section 194.
30 Vanderslice v. Shawn, supra, note 23.
31 See cases cited 8upra, note 22.
32Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co., 1928 USAvR 42 (Dist. Ct.
Ramsey Co., Minn., 1923).
33 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, supra, note 10, and Thrasher v. City of Atlanta,
178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817, 1934 USAvR 166 (1934).
34 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., supra, note 17.
35 See cases cited supra note 22.36 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Corp., 84 F. (2d) 755, 1936 USAvR 1
(C.C.A. 9th 1936), cert. den. 300 U.S. 654, 1937 USAvR 173 (1937).
37 United States v. Causby et ux, supra, note 18.38 See Noel, supra, note 11 at page 573.
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of the proposed airports. In Antonik v. Chamberlain, 39 the Ohio Court
of Common Pleas, Summit County, on December 7, 1946, restrained the
development of a privately-owned airport near Akron, Ohio, on the
ground that it would materially impair the value of adjacent property,
substantially interfere with the use of that property and commit re-
peated and continuing acts of trespass and nuisance and constitute a
continuing nuisance. In Crew v. Gallagher,40 the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas, Chester County, on December 23, 1946, on similar facts,
rendered a similar decision based on the finding that an airport near
Philadelphia would constitute a private nuisance. These two recent
cases amply demonstrate that this field will be a most active area of
litigation for many years as the respective rights of landowners and
airport operators are adjudicated by the courts.
AIRPORT ZONING
The protection of airport approaches from hazards to air naviga-
tion presents one of the most important of current airport legal prob-
lems. This problem arises out of the fact that while a city or county
may purchase hundreds of acres for an airport, an obstruction in the ap-
proach to one of the airport's runways can render the entire project
worthless, resulting in the loss of the millions of dollars which a modern
airport costs. Under existing C.A.A. regulations, aerial approaches ex-
tending at least two miles from the ends of all airport runways are
required for all of the larger airports. 41 A 30-to-i descent or approach
glide angle is required, or, in the case of instrument landing, a descent
glide angle at a rate of 40-to-1. This means that in the case of most
airports there can be no structure, tree or other object within two miles
of the ends of the runways of the airport which is higher than 1/30th
or 1/40th of its distance from the end of the runway.
To meet this problem the idea of zoning the area surrounding air-
ports so as to limit the height of obstructions has been advocated in a
model state statute drafted and sponsored by the National Institute
of Municipal Law Officers and the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
This model statute or a statute of similar provisions has now been
adopted by 35 states and by Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. 42 Under
this model act cities and counties may adopt airport zoning ordinances
restricting the height of buildings, structures or objects of natural
growth (like trees) in the approach zones of airports which are "utilized
in the interest of the public."
It is sincerely believed that this idea of airport zoning offers a rea-
sonable solution to this very difficult problem. For example, Wichita
recently purchased land outside its corporate limits for a new airport
because its existing airport was not fully usable due to obstructions to
certain of its runways. Almost immediately the land surrounding the
39 235 C.C.H. § 2310.
40 235 C.C.H. § 2311.
41 Hunter, supra, note 12 at page 540.42 State Airport Zoning Legislation, January, 1947-release of the Office
of Airports, C.A.A., Department of Commerce.
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new airport location was selling for high prices and plans were being
made to erect many-storied hotels and other structures which would
have rendered that site worthless as an airport. Under these circum-
stances an airport zoning statute and airport zoning ordinance are the
only solution.
One thing to emphasize about airport zoning is that it is not de-
signed to operate retroactively so as to require the taking down of exist-
ing structures. It operates only in the future, and so long as it merely
reasonably restricts the height of property surrounding an airport it is
believed that the basic legal principles of police power zoning will sus-
tain its validity. 43 In the two reported cases on the validity of airport
zoning regulations the regulations were, however, held invalid. In
Newark an airport zoning ordinance was held invalid because there was
no state enabling statute authorizing the city to adopt such an ordi-
nance. 44 This defect is now being cured by adoption of proper enabling
legislation. In Baltimore a state statute was held unconstitutional be-
cause it was so drafted as to limit structures immediately adjacent to the
Baltimore airport to a height of not more than five feet. The court
held this limitation was unreasonable. 45
In a Federal District Court in Louisiana the Federal Government
sought to condemn an easement ranging at from 25 to 40 feet above
certain land adjacent to a local airport. The condemnation jury re-
turned a verdict that the easement was worth "no dollars" because of
the existence of an airport zoning ordinance prohibiting the erection or
maintenance of structures in excess of 25 feet in height on the particular
property. The court rendered an opinion upholding this verdict and
thus indirectly upheld the validity of the airport zoning ordinance. 46
In Massachusetts, by way of dictum, the Supreme Judicial Court of that
state held that the airport, zoning act "contains adequate provisions
for securing and regulating the approaches to public airports." 47
Extensive consideration of the various legal problems involved in
airport zoning is not possible in this limited paper. The zoning cases
establish quite clearly the legal principle that private property rights
are relative rather than absolute, and that police power regulation may
go so far as to interfere with existing and established uses of private
property without compensation. 48 These cases also hold that there is
a point beyond which "regulation" becomes "confiscation", so valid air-
port zoning regulations must stay within the scope of police power regu-
lation or they will be declared unconstitutional. Where to draw the line
is the important question.
43 Hunter, supra, note 12, page 552 et seq.; RHYNE, supra, note 4, page 177
et seq.; Noel, supra, note 11, at page 15 et seq.
44 Yara Engineering Corp. v; City of Newark, 40 A. (2d) 559, 1945 USAvR
117 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945).45 Mutual Chemical Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 1939 USAvR
11 (Circuit Ct. Baltimore, 1939).
46 U.S. v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F. Supp. 461, 1944 USAvR 36 (W.D.
La. 1944).47 Burnham v. Beverly Airways Inc., supra, note 22.
48 RHYNE, supra, note 4 at page 177 et seq.
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In addition to the general principles enunciated by the courts in
zoning cases there is present in airport zoning the safety idea, which,
standing alone, without the use of the community benefit principle
which supports general zoning, might be a sufficient legal basis for some
courts in upholding airport zoning. The large stake of all the people
in the community in aviation and the physical danger to those using the
airport from obstructions are certainly factors that should weigh heavily
in support of airport zoning.
DAMAGE CLAIMS AGAINST AIRPORT OWNERS AND OPERATORS
With respect to damage claims against airport owners and operators,
the general rule is that the operator and his employees must exercise
ordinary care as to persons and property on the airport or respond in
damages for all injury resulting from lack of such care. As in most
other instances, attempts to define ordinary care in the operation of
an airport are not very useful because the definition of "ordinary care"
depends upon the facts of each particular case. While the operator of
the airport must exercise ordinary care, so also must the person using
the airport. Following the usual rule of law, recovery against the negli-
gent operator is barred where the negligence of the person injured con-
tributes in some way to the injury.
An analysis of cases wherein the airport operator has been held liable
to an injured party indicates that the injury occurred through one or
more of the following acts of negligence on the part of the operator:
First, the negligent operation of the airport by the operator himself, or
his employee acting in the scope of his employment, as in the California
case of Coleman v. City of Oakland, 49 decided in 1930, where the City
was held liable for damages caused by the negligent operation of a city
truck being used to improve the airport; Second, failure to anticipate
and avoid a foreseeable risk or danger as in Peavey v. City of Miami, 5o
where the city was held liable for personal injuries to an aviator, and for
damages to an airplane, resulting from a collision between the airplane
and road machinery left on a runway without proper warning or signals;
Third, failure to discharge a non-delegable duty to keep the premises
free from dangerous conditions, as in the English case of Imperial Air-
ways v. National Flying Services, ," where the airport operator was held
liable for failing to remedy a situation which allowed an airplane to
crash through a covering over a concealed stream which ran through
the airport; Fourth, failure to properly discharge the duties of a bailee
in caring for a plane stored in the custody of the airport, as in the Min-
nesota case. of Zanker v. Cedar Flying Service, 52 where a negligent bailee
was held liable for failure to stake an airplane subsequently destroyed
in a windstorm.
On the other hand, cases -have indicated that the airport owner will
not be liable under the following conditions: First, when the airport
49 64 Cal. App. 73, 295 P. 59, 1931 USAvR 61 (1930).50 146 Fla. 629, 1 So. (2d) 614, 1941 USAvR 28 (1941).
51 1933 USAvR 50 (K. B. Div., June 16, 1932).52 214 Minn. 242, 7 N.W. (2d) 775, 1943 USAvR 51 (1943).
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is operated by an independent contractor-lessee and the owner being
sued was not personally negligent as in the case of Christopher v. City of
El Paso, 53 where the city was held not liable to a spectator at an air show
at the municipal airport, as the city had leased the airport to a private
operator and no negligence on the part of the city was proved; Second,
when the injured party was contributorily negligent. This is well illus-
trated by the Wisconsin case of Davies v. Oshkosh Airport, Inc., 54 where
the plaintiff's airplane was returning to an airport on the evening of
July 10, 1928; and approached the field from the northwest, in a north-
west wind. The plane skirted the west side of the field, circled the
south end, and then approached the field from the southeast. In land-
ing, the plaintiff's pilot was blinded by the sun and the plane struck a
hayrack which was negligently left on the runway. The plaintiff sued
for resulting damages to his plane. In the trial court the jury found
for the plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment,
holding that the pilot was negligent as a matter of law if he voluntarily
attempted to land at a time when he was unable, because his vision was
obscured, to see the hayrake.
A somewhat similar factual situation was presented in the New
York case of Read v. New York City Airport, Inc., 55 where an airplane
which was taxiing down the runway collided with a truck that had been
negligently left on the runway by the airport operator. There, too, the
court found that the pilot had not exercised reasonable care to see that
the course he was pursuing was not dangerous and recovery for dam-
age to the plane was denied.
Finally, the airport operator has escaped liability where, the operator
being a city or other public body, courts have classified such operation
as a governmental, as opposed to a proprietary, function. A majority of
courts which have ruled on this classification have held the operation
of an airport by a city to be a proprietary function, and thus subject
to the same liabilities as a private operator. ", Wisconsin is among those
jurisdictions wherein no cases have determined this question.
53 98 S.W. (2d) 394, 1937 USAvR 153, (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
54 214 Wisc. 236, 252 N.W. 602, 1934 USAvR 122 (1934).
55 259 N. Y. S. 245, 1933 USAvR 31 (Mun. Ct. of N. Y. C., 1932).
56 Cases holding that in the operation of an airport cities are engaged in a
proprietary function: Peavy v. City of Miami, cited supra, note 52; Christopher
v. City of El Paso, cited supra, note 53; Pignet v. City of Santa Monica, 29 Cal.
App. (2d) 286, 84 P. (2d) 166, 1939 USAvR 28 (1938); Coleman v. City of Oak-
land, cited supra, note 49; Mollencop v. City of Salem, 139 Ore. 137, 8 P. (2d)
783, 1932 USAvR 22 (1932); City of Blackwell v. Lee, 178 Okla. 338, 62 P. (2d)
1219, 1937 USAvR 180 (1936); Godfrey v. City of Flint, 284 Mich. 291, 279 N.W.
516, 1938 USAvR 33 (1938) ; City of Mobile v. Lartigue, 23 Ala. App. 479, 127
So. 257, 1930 USAvR 50 (1930).
Cases holding cities operating an airport are engaged in a governmental
function: Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 230 Iowa 494, 298 N.W. 649, 138 A.L.R.
120, 1941 USAvR 39 (1941); Mayor, etc., City of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App.
661, 189 S.E. 63, 1937 USAvR 47 (1936) ; Stocker v. City of Nashville, 174 Tenn.
483, 126 S.W. (2d) 339, 1939 USAvR 42 (1939).
